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Social hierarchies and inequality in a society are shaped by the modes of production that 
extract and transfer surplus among social groups. In China under socialism, the redistributive 
economy established a powerful tributary mode of production (TMP) that extracted surplus from 
rural areas to cities and from commoner producers to cadre-officials. This TMP created two 
fundamental hierarchies in socialist China: the urban-rural divide and the official-commoner 
divide, both of which were based on politically defined statuses.  
China’s post-socialist transition has led to both a resurgence of the traditional petty-
commodity mode of production (PCMP) and the rise of a novel capitalist mode of production 
(CMP). The PCMP and CMP have created new social hierarchies that are based on people’s 
economic positions in markets and are making today’s Chinese society increasing stratified by a 
hierarchy of economically determined classes. 
In both rural and urban areas, a new economic elite has emerged, who accumulated their 
wealth from entrepreneurial activities under the CMP. The rank of petty-commodity producers 
has also increased sharply through urban self-employment and household-based commercial 
productions in rural areas. The nature of the urban-rural divide is also changing. Although the 
politically defined urban and rural statuses are still in effect, economic positions in the labor and 
housing markets are becoming more important in determining rural migrants’ life chances in 
cities and in shaping inequality between urban and rural areas.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A sense of hierarchy is deeply entrenched in the Chinese culture and in ordinary people’s 
understanding and construction of social relations (social space). Related with this, some form of 
hierarchical structure is also manifested in almost all social relations. At its core, traditional 
China’s li (rituals) is mainly about defining hierarchies and relationships between different 
positions in these hierarchical structures. Thus, one would find in Analects, the Confucianism 
canon, repeated and detailed documentation of how Confucius himself followed these rituals and 
acted out the social hierarchies through interacting in different ways with different people and 
objects.  
The renowned Chinese sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, provided probably the most vivid and 
most widely cited conceptualization of how, in traditional Chinese society, a person’s social 
relationships are hierarchically structured (Fei 1992). On a personal level, according to Fei, each 
person’s relationship with others is based on a differential mode of association that centers on the 
self and then extends outwards, first to parents, spouse and siblings, and then to the extended 
family, to the lineage group, and finally to unrelated members of the society, like a series of 
concentric circles, hierarchically placed in increasing relational distances from the self at the 
center. For people inhabiting in such a hierarchically organized relational world, everything is 
relative, whether it is the rule of an economic exchange, the form of an interaction, or the 
morality of a conduct; it all depends on where the other party is located in one’s differential 
order of relationships. 
This culturally rooted differential mode of association may still provide the mental 
framework for many Chinese today to relate and respond to the outside social world. At least, the 
kind of self-centered behaviors – pursing family interest at the public’s cost and pursuing self 
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interest at family’s cost – which Fei used to characterize social life in traditional villages, can 
still be easily witnessed today. The rampant use of guanxi – personal relations – in facilitating 
public or official transactions – by turning an impersonal transaction into a personal obligation 
that registers in one’s hierarchical structure of social relations – also attests to it.  
Aside from this more subjectively constructed relational hierarchy, people, however, also 
inhabit in more objectively constructed social hierarchies that powerfully shape their lives and, 
through which, their relationships with others. Such structural hierarchies – the unequal 
distribution of valuable assets to different social positions and the different life chances these 
positions present to their incumbents – form an external social fact that, regardless of people’s 
awareness of it, exerts powerful influence on their lives.  
A society is differentiated and stratified in many ways; thus, hierarchies can be formed 
and found along multiple dimensions: political power, social honor, economic wealth, cultural 
knowledge, and even skin color. All hierarchies, however, do not have the same import. In any 
society, therefore, one can potentially identify a “hierarchy of hierarchies” – different dimensions 
of social inequality and hierarchy themselves form a hierarchy in terms of its importance in 
shaping people’s lives and social relationships.  
One useful way to understand this “hierarchy of hierarchies” in a given society is to see it 
as determined by how economic activities are organized in that society. By “economic 
activities”, we mean, following Polanyi (1957), “interaction between man and his environment, 
which results in a continuous supply of want-satisfying material means (p. 248),” which, after 
all, is the main activity that has preoccupied most people’s lives throughout human history. From 
this perspective, the most important social hierarchy is then formed on the basis of the dominant 
mode of production (MOP) in an economy – the system of creating, extracting, transferring and 
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distributing economic surplus among different social groups. While this hierarchy is formed in 
the processes of economic production and consumption, as we shall see, the basis of this 
hierarchy – the resource used to create and maintain this hierarchy – is not necessarily economic, 
but can be political power, social status or even religious quality.  
This chapter will discuss the basic structure of social hierarchies in Chinese society in 
three historical periods. To help understand the formation of these hierarchies, each of the 
following sections starts with a discussion on the dominant modes of production in that historical 
period, which, through the extraction and transfer of surplus, determine how social groups are 
placed into hierarchical positions, facing unequal life chances. 
 
HIERARCHIES IN TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOCIETY 
Hill Gates (1996) contends that for the past one thousand years, socioeconomic hierarchy 
in Chinese society was primarily structured by two different modes of production: the state-
managed tributary mode of production (TMP) and the lineage-based petty commodity mode of 
production (PCMP). As Gates summarizes:   
“For a thousand years in the late-imperial tributary mode, a class of scholar-
officials has transferred surpluses from the various producer classes (peasants, 
petty capitalists, laborers) to themselves by means of direct extraction as tribute, 
taxes, corvee, hereditary labor duties, and the like. In the private markets that 
flourished in China from the Song forward, free producers transferred any 
remaining surpluses among the commoner classes by means of wage labor and a 
hierarchical kinship/gender system (p. 7).” 
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These two political-economic systems of organizing production and distributing surplus 
placed Chinese people within their reach into a two-tiered class structure – a hierarchy of 
unequal living conditions and life chances. Under the TMP, extraction of surplus from producers 
by holders of political power created the most important status divide in the traditional society: 
officials vs. commoners. Within the two great tributary classes of officials and commoners – 
which, to use Max Weber’s terminology, should be more strictly called “status groups” – second-
tier hierarchies still existed. To quote Gates’ memorable description again:  
“Hereditary miners were easily distinguishable from academics of the ‘Forest of 
Pencils,’ county magistrates, and the magistrates’ bullying runners, though all were 
state servants; rich pawnshop owners were different in important ways from 
owner-operator farmers or artisans and from hired laborers, though all were 
commoners (p. 21).” 
Members of the officialdom could be stratified by hereditary title, administrative rank, 
factional affiliation, and technical specialization. But even those who served the state in 
commoner-like manual positions nevertheless shared one thing in common with magistrates of 
the imperial court, which set them apart from the commoners: their labor was spent not in direct 
production of goods or services, but rather to administer, facilitate, or ideologically justify the 
extraction of surpluses from direct producers.  
The status difference was the most pronounced between commoners and the scholar-
officials – the ruling elite among the officialdom. Mobility into the officialdom in imperial China 
was achieved through advancement in the competitive examination system, not through heredity. 
Those who passed the examinations gained admission into officialdom and became eligible for 
appointment into state administrative posts. Gaining the scholar-official status not only allowed 
 7 
one to receive transfer of extracted surplus in the form of salaries and perquisites, it also 
exempted one from conscription, corporal punishment and corvee. Scholar-officials were also 
entitled to use certain ceremonial rituals (for marriage, funeral and sacrifice) that were prohibited 
for commoners. The status difference between commoners and scholar-officials was manifested 
physically: only those who passed certain rank of examination were allowed to wear long robes.  
This status hierarchy was primarily created non-economically: extraction by the state 
through political and military means – the defining feature of the TMP. The mechanism of such 
non-economic extraction and the status hierarchy it created is well illustrated in one area: when 
scholar-officials travelled across imperial territories, they were housed at an extensive network 
of inns and residences, where both material consumption and services were provided by local 
commoners who were impressed – by the threat of corporal punishment – into such services.  
As we shall see in following sections, both the TMP and the status divide it creates 
between officials and commoners are long-lasting features of the Chinese society, even to the 
present day.  
In the PCMP in imperial China, the main unit of petty-commodity production was 
patricorporations – household and lineage enterprises that owned or controlled properties and 
used mainly family labor to produce commodities to be sold on markets for profit (Gates 1996). 
Although wage labor existed, it was mainly used to compensate for family labor deficit in these 
patricorporations.  
Within these patricorporations, surpluses were still transferred among members on the 
basis of the hierarchical kinship/gender relations. By resting ownership of properties, command 
over production process, and control of consumption patterns in the male, elder, and agnatic 
members of the patricorporation, the PCMP thus translated the relational hierarchy that existed 
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among family members, which was culturally defined and politically enforced, into a 
socioeconomic hierarchy.  
Apart from the hierarchy that existed within the patricorporations, the PCMP also created 
socioeconomic hierarchies within the commoner class. Differential initial endowments and 
market competition placed different producers into three main class positions: the petty 
capitalists who owned capital and hired labor, owner-operators who relied on their own labor, 
capital or land in secure tenancy, and laborers who depended on the selling of labor.  
The domination of the PCMP by the TMP – and thus, the subjection of properties and 
surpluses in PCMP to the extraction by state power – limited the owning of properties and 
accumulation of wealth within household or lineage boundaries. Any attempts to go beyond the 
lineage boundary to form nonkin-based enterprises were usually thwarted by a host of counter 
forces: the law of equal inheritance, officials’ hostility toward such enterprises and the ensuing 
exactions, and the lack of legal institutions to deal with disputes involving nonkin parties.  
Facing these limitations, petty-commodity producers, especially those who accumulated 
resources beyond their capacity to expand their households or lineages, sought to convert their 
wealth into officeholding and cross the commoner-official divide by investing heavily in their 
sons’ education, or more directly, purchasing academic titles. Only by gaining, first, academic 
credentials and then, a membership in the officialdom, these local economic elites in imperial 
China– often referred to as the landed gentry – were then able to safeguard the private wealth 
they accumulated from the PCMP with public power gained in the TMP (Ho 1964).  
By taking public roles and acting as local agents of the state who helped the latter to 
extract surplus, these local elites shifted from being victims of tributary extraction to 
beneficiaries and thus, gained the opportunity to use state power to further enrich themselves. 
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This mutually beneficial marriage between economic wealth and political power, rooted in the 
subordination of the PCMP under the TMP, continues to be a profitable strategy even in today’s 
China.  
 
HIERARCHIES IN SOCIALIST CHINA 
Despite a tumultuous century of confrontation with the outside world and internal societal 
transformation, the existence of some form of state – and thus the functioning of state-managed 
tributary mode of production – and competitive markets – and thus the functioning of petty 
commodity mode of production – persisted to be the two dominant modes of production that 
shaped socioeconomic hierarchy in Chinese society. The real fundamental change to these two 
modes of production and, subsequently, to hierarchies in society, came only after the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949. During the socialist era (1949 to 1978), the reach and 
strength of the TMP reached its apex, whereas the PCMP was suppressed to the point of near 
elimination. 
 Upon its founding, in the domestic arena, the new socialist state had two main missions: 
creating an egalitarian society on the basis of public ownership of means of production and 
industrializing a predominantly agrarian society with a near-collapse economy after decades of 
war. Both policy goals required a thorough transformation of the existing social hierarchies in 
Chinese society. On the one hand, riding on the support and sacrifice of poor peasants and urban 
workers, the new regime needed to deliver its promises about raising the status of peasants and 
workers, chief among them: land to the tillers. This entailed a massive transformation of the 
ownership of property and distribution of wealth in the country, which could only be 
implemented by a powerful state that could suppress any resistance from the propertied classes. 
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On the other, the regime’s plan of state-led rapid industrialization required a transformation of 
the mode of production to allow the state to rapidly accumulate the needed capital for industrial 
investment. In an agrarian economy with little industrial foundation, the capital accumulation 
had to come from the agricultural sector and rural producers. This required the socialist state to 
ratchet up its tributary system to transfer surplus from rural producers into the central state’s 
coffer and then invested in both building urban industries as well as creating new urban 
administrative and working classes. 
Changes to the existing modes of production were soon carried out to serve these policy 
goals. First, the state-managed TMP that helped to extract surplus into the hands of the state was 
strengthened to an unprecedented level. Second, to further eliminate competition with the state 
and concentrate resources into state’s control, the market-based PCMP was suppressed by the 
state to the point of near elimination. 
By the mid-1950s, the new regime had already completed much of the socialist 
transformation of the national economy. A new socialist economy was in place, providing the 
basis for a new set of social hierarchies to emerge. Although the state had proclaimed creating an 
egalitarian society as its goal and indeed successfully transformed pre-existing social hierarchies, 
true equality turned out to be an elusive goal. New social hierarchies soon started to take shape 
on the basis of the transformed modes of production.  
 
Socialist Transformations of Chinese Society 
The socialist state embarked on an ambitious project of social transformation, aimed to 
re-engineer class structure of the society. Such transformation would then allow the state to 
penetrate into the lowest level of society and eliminate countervailing forces and local elite, both 
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of which enabled the state to extend the reach and strength of its tributary extraction. The state 
quickly put this TMP-on-steroid to work: extract rural surplus to serve its ambitious agenda of 
state-led industrialization. 
The transformation started in rural areas with the land reform in early 1950s, which 
seized land and properties from the landlord and rich peasant classes and redistributed them – 
largely following egalitarian principles – to all rural households. Giving private ownership of 
land and property to peasant households provided a foundation for the continued operation of 
PCMP and, not surprisingly, soon led to the reemergence of inequality among rural households. 
At the same time, the state’s industrialization planned also required more control over 
agricultural production and harvest than private land ownership and individually organized 
production could provide (Shue 1980). In late 1950s, the state started to push for collectivization 
in rural areas, transferring land ownership from individual households to collective brigades and 
communes and organizing production collectively. The PCMP was greatly reduced, as its 
material foundation – private land – was pulled from underneath it. Peasants were only left with 
small plots of land to grow vegetables for self consumption.  
Although rural residents’ private land ownership was short-lived, the rural social 
structure was nevertheless indelibly changed by the land reform. The landed gentry, the political 
and economic elite in pre-socialist China, were eliminated as a class – in some extreme cases, not 
only socioeconomically, but also physically; the rural socioeconomic hierarchy was effectively 
flattened – the Chinese countryside became a sea of small peasant households under socialism. 
Political status became a more significant dimension of hierarchy that set rural residents 
apart – in a way that reversed the previous hierarchy in rural society. As the communist party 
drew support and most of its low-level cadres from the poor peasant class, in establishing new 
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grassroots level governments in the countryside, the revolutionary state entrusted local power – 
and operation of surplus extraction – to political activists who rose from among poor peasants. 
Thus, as a class, poor peasants gained not only economically through the redistribution of 
landlords’ properties, but also politically the extractive power granted by the new state. The 
former landed gentry and other classes classified as counter-revolutionary, on the other hand, not 
only descended economically to the same level – if not worse – as other rural residents, but also 
regularly became subjects of political attack and public humiliation. 
A similar social transformation also swept Chinese cities. Private properties of urban 
capitalists were seized by the state and private enterprises turned first into public-private joint 
ventures and then publicly owned enterprises. As in rural areas, the PCMP declined, first, 
because private properties were seized; second, for those hold-outs, as more resources began to 
be included in the central-planned redistribution, markets for industrial inputs and consumer 
products both constricted, further squeezing the space for the PCMP. The state’s direct control 
over the increasing number of public enterprises strengthened the TMP, allowing the state to 
extract surplus from these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs) into the central-planned redistribution of resources for investment and consumption. 
The establishment of state-owned enterprises gave rise to a new system of regulating 
urban consumption and workers’ lives – the work units. These urban work units provided their 
employees a cradle-to-grave system of social services that included housing, childcare, 
healthcare, education, pension, old-age care, and even on-site canteens and public bathing 
houses. The work units were also a part of the state’s plan of managing urban collective 
consumption. Replacing markets for housing and other consumption needs with state-planned 
 13 
allocation helped the state to suppress labor wages and private consumption, so that more 
surpluses could be re-invested into industrialization. 
With the establishment of a public enterprise system and state-planned allocation of 
resources, a new hierarchy also emerged in the urban employment structure (Bian 1994). SOE 
workers became a new labor aristocracy, who enjoyed full benefits of the cradle-to-grave welfare 
system. COEs, in comparison, were usually smaller and had lower administrative ranks; their 
ability to provide for their employees was more limited. The remaining petty-commodity 
producers, who struggled at the margin of the state-run economy and had no work units to 
provide for them, constituted the bottom rung of this urban employment hierarchy.    
Within the state sector, yet another tier of hierarchy existed, as each work unit was 
assigned an administrative rank and, with it, a differential level of operational autonomy and 
command over resources (Walder 1992). Within the same work unit, a socioeconomic also 
existed on the basis of the politically determined administrative hierarchy, as people assigned to 
higher ranks were also given better compensations. Thus, similar to rural areas, the political 
hierarchy became the primary dimension of social inequality: the higher one’s administrative 
position and the more politically power (in terms of both property rights and administrative rank) 
one’s employer was, the more redistributive power one had and better benefits one received.  
 
The Urban-Rural Divide and Official-Commoner Divide 
By suppressing the PCMP which had been traditionally organized on the basis of 
patriarchal kinship organizations, the socialist transformation greatly reduced the hierarchy 
within the family, especially in urban areas. Family was no longer the unit of production and 
many family functions were shifted to non-familial institutions, managed by the state, in the 
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urban work units. Ideologically, the state also attacked the traditional patriarchal culture and 
hierarchy. New legislations outlawed and eliminated many traditional family practices that 
subjected women to patriarchal domination.  
The strengthened TMP, however, erected new hierarchies in its own mold.  Hierarchies 
among different social groups based on their standings in the tributary mode of production 
intensified, especially along two dimensions: urban vs. rural and officials vs. commoners. 
Fundamentally, the rural-urban divide was created by state’s extraction of rural surplus, 
which was then invested in urban industries and social services. To maintain a loyal and 
productive urban working class, and also to keep urban consumption at a low level, the state 
provided social services to state workers in cities through the work unit system. In rural areas, 
many social services were also provided, such as basic healthcare and immunization, literacy 
education, public projects such as irrigation and road building, and as a result, greatly improved 
all kinds of human development measures. But, because of the inherent urban bias in the state-
led industrialization model (i.e., transfer of rural surplus into urban investment), gaps in living 
standards between rural and urban areas persisted. 
The socioeconomic inequalities between rural and urban areas, although created by the 
state-led industrialization model, had to be maintained by a politically defined status hierarchy 
that the state created between rural and urban residents. The existence of wide gaps between 
rural and urban living standards would have created a spontaneous city-bound migration by rural 
residents, which would have threatened to both reduce surplus created in the agricultural sector 
and divert industrial investment into urban consumption. To prevent this and to keep rural 
producers staying within the reach of TMP, the state implemented strict residential control 
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through the Household Registration System (HRS), which separated rural and urban residents 
into two distinct classes of citizens.  
Rural residents, without urban registration, were not only denied of urban employment 
opportunities, but also excluded from the rationed distribution of many basic consumption items, 
ranging from housing to salt, making it highly difficult for any unauthorized migrants to survive 
in cities. Except for a few channels of mobility, all managed by the state, which allowed for 
some rural residents to move to and settle in cities, a highly rigid status hierarchy – based on 
residential registration – separated urban and rural residents. This urban-rural divide became a 
long-lasting legacy of the socialist era, shaping the trajectories of many later developments. 
The subsuming of a great amount of economic activities under the TMP also 
strengthened another divide that long existed in the Chinese society: that between the 
officialdom, who now were even more empowered with a strong socialist state and the central-
planning institutions that organized the redistributive economic system, and the commoners, who 
were further deprived of the opportunity to accumulate some economic wealth in a subordinate 
PCMP. The socialist officialdom, although now called by a different name, selected through 
different procedures, and proclaiming a different ideology, nevertheless, shared one fundamental 
commonality with the imperial ruling class of scholar-officials: they exercised state power in 
extracting tributes from commoners and received compensation from the extracted surplus. 
Because the socialist state put almost all areas of society under its administration, this 
official-commoner divide and the administrative hierarchy within the officialdom also penetrated 
and manifested themselves in all walks of life, far beyond just government bureaucracies or 
state-owned enterprises. In non-economic organizations, such as state-run universities, hospitals 
or theatre companies, the leaders also had a rank within the same administrative hierarchy that 
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included all government officials, SOE managers, and military officers. All these ranks were 
directly comparable, thus, allowing one to be transferred from a position in an army unit to a 
university post of the same rank. The entire society became encompassed within the 
administrative hierarchy, with the great majority of the population merely commoners, at the 
bottom of the hierarchy and having no administrative rank, while a small officialdom on top, 
itself hierarchically organized in multiple ranks. 
Entering the officialdom became a quantum leap in social mobility. And such entrance 
was strictly controlled by the state. Even the privileged urban SOE workers didn’t automatically 
have the “cadre status”. Before an ordinary worker could be promoted to an administrative post – 
gaining a position in the administrative hierarchy – he or she first needed to be granted a “cadre 
quota” and thus changing his/her status from a commoner to a cadre, a member of the 
officialdom. Almost as a continuation of the imperial examination system that selected 
commoners into the scholar-official class, university students were automatically given cadre 
status and job allocation in public work units upon graduation. 
 
Social Mobility under Socialism 
Despite the profound social changes implemented by the new socialist regime to create a 
more egalitarian society, the “new society” remained highly hierarchical. Furthermore, with the 
strengthening of the TMP under the socialist central-planned economy, hierarchies that had long 
existed in traditional Chinese society – those between rural and urban and between officials and 
commoners – became even more intensified, their boundaries now carefully guarded by state 
institutions ranging from household registration to public work units. 
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Mobility, however, still existed in these hierarchies, albeit managed by the state. The 
state-making project of the new regime, which involved steady expansions of the political, 
administrative and military apparatuses of the state, had to draw manpower from the classes that 
formed its political bases – small peasants and tenant farmers in rural areas and the working class 
in cities. As a result, a large number of people from rural origin and form peasant-and-worker 
family backgrounds were brought into cities and given jobs in state institutions and enterprises 
(Walder 1984). Through political mobility, based on both job performance and political loyalty, 
some even acquired Party membership and rose into the officialdom. 
The higher-education system, which was suspended for a six-year hiatus during the 
height of the Cultural Revolution, provided another channel of upward mobility through the 
hierarchies. Although it’s debated whether the higher education system under socialist China 
merely helped to reproduce social hierarchies by giving children from cities and from politically 
elite classes better chance of advancing, there is evidence showing that at least in some periods, 
the preferential treatment given to children from peasant and worker families increased their 
chances of enrolling in universities and moving up the social ladder (Deng and Treiman 1997). 
Within cities, as labor market was replaced with planned job allocation by the state, 
mobility between different work sectors and different work units was tightly controlled by the 
state and highly limited. Aside from employer-initiated re-assignment of jobs, self-motivated job 
changes had been rare well into the 1980s, when reform of the state-dominated urban 
employment system just started (Davis 1992). To change a job, one almost always had to draw 
on personal connections to pull strings at not only current and future employers, but also the 
local personnel bureau to make it happen (Bian 1997). 
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The first thirty years of socialist China was also notable for the repeated occurrences of 
policy-induced downward mobility, especially for the urban middle class (Davis 1992). During 
the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution, for example, millions of urban youth – 
graduates from urban secondary and high schools – were sent down to the countryside, 
sometimes in the remote frontier areas, to be “re-educated by the laboring masses” (Bernstein 
1978). Most of the sent-down youth eventually returned to cities when the policy was abandoned 
in late 1970s; but some stayed, and more importantly, everyone’s life – the opportunity to obtain 
education, advance careers and form families – was irreparably changed by this experience 
(Zhou and Hou 1999). 
 
HIERARCHIES IN POST-SOCIALIST CHINA 
With the reform starting in late 1970s, another round of profound social changes began, 
although this time, in a more peaceful and incremental fashion than the Communist Revolution. 
In the first half of what has often been called the Reform or Post-Socialist Era (1978 to present), 
the central-planned, redistributive economy had remained in force and the dominance of the 
TMP intact. However, on the margins of the redistributive economy and the TMP, markets 
started to revive and expand. The PCMP, which had been suppressed and dormant for at least 
two decades, re-emerged; a new mode of production, the capitalist mode of production (CMP), 
also rose.  
 
The Resurgence of the PCMP 
Self-employment activities were again allowed in both cities and countryside at the 
beginning of the Reform, but limited to hiring no more than seven employees (Sabin 1994). In 
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cities, the return of sent-down youths from the countryside and the entry into labor force of birth 
cohorts born during the peak birth rates in the 1960s created rampant unemployment. The state 
had to open up the private petty-commodity production as a way to accommodate the growing 
labor force’s demand for jobs. Initially, self-employment mainly attracted disadvantaged groups 
– people who could not get jobs in the state sector, which were still the most coveted jobs. 
These new petty-commodity producers were different from their historical predecessors 
in one key aspect: their petty-commodity production was usually an individual endeavor and did 
not family or kinship relations. The traditional patricorporations did not come back with this 
resuscitation of the PCMP because, on the one hand, 30 years of socialism had already broken up 
urban families as the unit of production and individualized labor, and on the other, state jobs 
were still far more family-friendly.  In fact, even in later years of the Reform, when self-
employment activities in the growing market economies were becoming profitable and 
respectable, many families still tried to hedge their risks by keeping some members in the state 
sector to gain access to subsidized social services that were still tied to state work units. 
The growth of self-employment in cities increased sharply after 1992, when speed of the 
reform was accelerated and greater political support was given to market economy and private 
entrepreneurial activities. Another process also contributed to the rise in self-employment: the 
state sector reform that started to downsize SOEs and lay off redundant workers in mid- to late-
1990s. As a result, an internal hierarchy appeared in the petty-commodity production sector. 
Those who entered to pursue entrepreneurial career opportunities brought with them greater 
capital and skills and usually had greater success and financial returns from self-employment. 
Others who were pushed into petty-commodity production by state-sector downsizing and were 
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seeking a refuge from poverty had little more than their own labor to rely on and had much fewer 
chances of getting into prosperity.  
In rural areas, however, the resurgence of the PCMP took a markedly different path. The 
rural reform, which started in a bottom-up fashion, only later sanctioned and promoted by the 
central government, disbanded rural communes and brigades as collective units of production, 
re-assigned land use rights to rural households, and, as a result, restored households as the unit of 
production and consumption in rural areas. The rural economy was again dominated by a sea of 
smallholding, household producers.  
Although many these small farming households remained subsistence producers – 
producing for self-consumption – more and more were becoming commodity producers who 
produce both agricultural and non-agricultural goods for the markets. Rural households were still 
within the reach of the TMP, subjected to the state’s extraction of tribute in the form of 
obligatory grain quotas to be delivered to the state. However, the floodgate was opened to allow 
them to engage in market-oriented petty commodity production, whether diversifying into non-
farm employment or selling agricultural surplus on markets. The new rural economy resembled 
the pre-socialist formation, where both the TMP and PCMP existed. 
Before long, the trickle of rural petty-commodity production turned into a gusher, 
especially in non-farm production. The growth of rural non-farm employment took different 
forms in different regions: in the southern coastal region, more in the form of small family-based 
enterprises, similar to the traditional patricorporations; in northern coastal regions, more in the 
form of collective township-and-village enterprises (TVEs). For the first 15 years of the post-
socialist transition, the growth of TVEs and rural household enterprises became the main force 
that drove China’s rural industrialization and transfer of labor from farming to non-farming jobs. 
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As a result, it created a new dimension in rural social stratification: managers in TVEs, who were 
usually current or former village cadres, and the enterprising families became the new economic 
elite in rural society, accumulating wealth through market-based entrepreneurial activities that 
grew outside the reach of the TMP. 
 
The Emergence of the CMP 
A novel development of the post-socialist era, especially from 1990s onwards, is the 
emergence and rapid rise of a genuine capitalist mode of production (CMP) in the economy. The 
CMP differs from the PCMP that had a long tradition in Chinese economy in one crucial aspect: 
its reliance on commoditized labor. This further leads to three more differences. First, since 
commoditized labor is hired as employees, family and kinship relations no longer mediate the 
interaction among involved parties. Labor is treated and consumed as a commodity and stripped 
of the social relationships and identities attached to its owners – to the extent possible. Second, 
surplus extraction is based on ownership and control over means of production, not on gender 
and generational hierarchies within the family. It thus creates an occupational hierarchy of 
capitalists, managerial and professional staff, and proletarianized workers, which is independent 
of kinship relations. Finally, units of production in the CMP, in the form of modern companies, 
can potentially – and often do – grow into larger sizes than those in the PCMP – the 
patricorporations. 
A crucial landmark in the rise of the CMP in Chinese economy is the legalization of 
domestic private enterprises through a constitutional amendment in 1988, which gave protection 
to private properties and allowed the employment of eight or more employees. As a result, 
domestic private firms started to grow, and joined the foreign invested firms, which first brought 
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in the CMP, in expanding the CMP in the economy. The growth of CMP was further fueled by 
the privatization of collective rural TVEs and urban SOEs in the 1990s. The number of domestic 
private firms increased sharply and some large-size firms started to emerge. In recent years, the 
domestic private sector has grown to one-third of the national economy, while foreign-invested 
private firms and state firms each takes another one third (Tsui, Bian, and Cheng 2006). With 
this rapid rise of the CMP, the transfer of surplus from commoditized laborers to capital owners 
emerges as a new and increasingly powerful process in creating social inequality and forming 
hierarchies. 
 
The Retreat and the Persistence of the TMP 
Not surprisingly, the resurgence of PCMP and rise of CMP pushed the once dominant 
TMP into a retreat, as the reform opened up new markets and shifted more economic activities 
outside the reach of the TMP. Although property reform in the form of privatization of public 
firms did not start on scale until the late 1990s, the dismantling of the central planning system 
started at the outset of the urban reform and proceeded gradually. After 1992, replacing the 
redistributive economy with a socialist market economy became a main policy goal of the state. 
In the increasingly marketized urban economy, the state withdrew its direct tributary extraction 
from the increasing number of non-state firms. Even in state firms, more management autonomy 
and property rights were devolved from governments to the firms themselves. Since late 1990s, 
the accelerated pace of privatization in state sectors, especially of smaller-scale SOEs further 
reduced the scale of the state-run economy and restricted the reach of the state-managed TMP.  
In recent years, however, after the initial period of retreat, the remaining large-scale 
SOEs, albeit small in number, have experienced a revival and helped to ensure that TMP remains 
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a powerful force in the new economic system and in shaping social hierarchies. These large-scale 
SOEs gained strength not only from influx of capital after being listed on domestic and overseas 
stock exchanges, but more importantly, from greater capacity of surplus extraction based on 
market monopoly (Huang 2008). These SOEs concentrated in the so-called “strategic sectors” of 
the national economy – where domestic private firms were prohibited from entering and only a 
selected few foreign firms were given access to: banking and finance, telecommunication, oil 
and petrochemical, energy and resources, and transportation and airlines. 
Protected by such politically granted market monopoly and emboldened by the political 
power they had within the state system, these SOEs were able to extract surplus from consumers 
in the form of monopoly rent, sometimes in excessive amounts and through illegitimate means. 
One blatant example involves the two state-owned oil and petrochemical giants, SinoPec and 
Petro China, which never missed a chance to raise prices of petroleum products when global oil 
price rose, but rarely cut prices down after global oil price dropped. 
The corporate reform implemented in these SOEs and their participation in capital, labor 
and other markets, however, transformed them from the traditional socialist firms into a new 
breed of state firms. Both the CMP and TMP are at work in these state monopoly firms: the state 
monopoly capital simultaneously extracts surplus from workers on the basis of control of means 
of production in the CMP and extracts surplus from consumers in the TMP through monopoly 
rent created and protected by the state’s political power. 
In rural areas, although the reform allowed households to diversify into farm and non-
farm productions outside the reach of TMP and gradually did away with state imposed 
mandatory quota of production, the intensity of the TMP nevertheless expanded for a period of 
time. In the 1990s, the fiscal reform and the privatization and decline of TVEs severely reduced 
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local governments’ revenue sources, local governments had no where to turn but to ratchet up 
their extraction of surplus from rural households. As a result, besides the agricultural tax levied 
by the central government, various levels of local governments created a myriad of new types of 
taxes, levies, charges, and corvee labor to extract surplus from rural residents (Bernstein and Lu 
2000). Excessive peasant burdens soon became a nationwide problem and led to the rapid 
deterioration of local governance in rural areas. 
This trend was finally reversed when the Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao administration came 
into office in 2003. In 2004, the agricultural tax was abolished nationwide and, with it, the 
central state’s direct surplus extraction from individual agricultural producers. A practice that 
had existed for over 2000 years in Chinese history and statecraft finally came to an end. 
Furthermore, the central government also started a direct subsidy to farmers on the basis of 
farmland size. The central government also implemented strict restrictions on the type and 
amount of taxes, levies and corvee labor that local governments can impose on rural residents. 
Although implementation varied across regions, the combination of these measures helped to 
curtail the power of the state-managed TMP in rural areas. 
 
Changes in Social Hierarchies 
Under socialism, the dominant mode of production – the TMP – was a political creation: 
the extractive power was based on political power of the state, in turning private properties into 
state properties, in controlling farmers’ harvest, in disciplining labor, and in restricting rural 
residents’ exit from state extraction. The hierarchies it created in the society, although had clear 
social and economic consequences, were primarily based on politically defined statuses. The 
society, thus, was a politically stratified society, or, in sociological terms, status-stratified 
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society. The most important hierarchies in society were those based on different politically 
defined statuses: urban vs. rural registration and officials vs. commoners. 
In the post-socialist China, both the PCMP and CMP experienced rapid rise. In these two 
modes of production, the extraction of surplus is based on economic ownership rather than 
political power. Post-socialism: Even the TMP, which remains powerful, now also mixes with 
and draws on the CMP, in the hybrid form of state monopoly capital, in its operation. As a result, 
there is no single dominant MOP; instead, both the economically based PCMP and CMP and the 
politically based TMP coexist in a hybrid formation.  
Correspondingly, the hierarchical structure of the society also changes, from comprising 
of primarily politically based hierarchies to a mixture of political and economic hierarchies, with 
the latter become increasingly significant. The most notable change in this process is, therefore, 
the emergence of economically based hierarchies – class stratification – in contemporary Chinese 
society, which can be seen from changes in the rural-urban divide and the emergence of new 
classes. 
 To what extent the rural-urban divide has weakened and whether rural-urban inequality 
has declined or increased are still hotly debated topics. Overshadowed by these debates, 
however, is an important change: the source of rural-urban inequality is shifting from political to 
economic. The household registration system that used to create the differential statuses between 
rural and urban residents is, indeed, still in effect. However, its impact on people’s life chances 
and living conditions has been considerably weakened.  
As the institutional barriers erected under socialism to help maintain the TMP and 
transfer of rural surplus into urban industries were gradually dismantled, urban lives were no 
longer dependent on the rationed allocation of consumer goods and social services, tied with 
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employment in work units and urban registration. In the past three decades, hundreds of millions 
of rural residents have migrated to cities – to either work temporarily or settle permanently. 
These rural migrants are indeed still poorly treated in cities, stigmatized by urbanites, and had 
difficulties in getting good jobs or permanently settle down; but these difficulties they encounter 
in cities – which are also faced by urban migrants – are increasingly the result of their 
disadvantaged economic positions in the CMP and PCMP, especially in labor and housing 
markets, and less the result of a politically defined rural status.  
In recent years, more policies helping the integration of rural migrants into cities are 
implemented across the country, albeit at different paces. For example, in some cities, children of 
rural migrants now have equal access as urban children to schools. Some cities even grant people 
who buy housing there urban residential status – that is, if they can afford it economically. Thus, 
when rural migrants improve their economic positions – by finding good-paying and stable jobs, 
for example – their ability to settle in cities and integrate into the urban life also increases. In the 
city of Xiamen, located on the southeastern coast, for example, migrants – most of rural origins – 
constitute about half of the city’s taxi drivers. This relatively stable job has allowed many to 
relocate their entire families from distant provinces like Henan, send their children to local 
schools, and even buy private housing in Xiamen.   
A similar change is happening to the inequality between urban and rural areas. In the 
past, the “rural” status was defined not because of one’s occupation in agriculture in the 
economic division of labor, but because of one’s position in a political classification – the 
household registration system. This rural status then simultaneously subjected one to the 
extraction of surplus under the TMP and excluded one from receiving transfer of surplus in the 
form of all kinds of urban social services. But nowadays, the rural registration status no longer 
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has such effect: rural producers are not only freed from the extraction by the central government, 
but also receive direct transfer of surplus in the form of farming subsidy. They can also freely 
migrate to cities and have gained access to many urban services.  
Rural areas are still generally poorer than cities, but not because they are politically 
subjected to the tributary extraction by cities, but rather mainly because of their specialization in 
the less profitable agricultural production in the economic division of labor, which occupies a 
peripheral and subordinate position to the manufacturing and financial industries in cities. When 
a rural area upgrades its economy from agriculture into manufacturing, as many rural villages in 
peri-urban locations did all over China, but particularly in coastal regions, it quickly improves its 
economic prosperity to a level comparable to similar urban areas, without ever changing its 
politically defined “rural” status.  
Another situation puts this new source of rural-urban inequality in even sharper relief: 
when rural residents manage to occupy advantageous positions in the economic system vis-à-vis 
urban residents, the urban-rural hierarchy can be reversed, without changing the political status 
that used to define rural and urban statuses. One can find such examples in what have been 
referred to as “villages-in-the-city”, or, chengzhongcun – rural villages encircled by the 
expanding city. Residents in these villages still have rural registration status – and thanks to that, 
property rights of land and houses located in these urban “villages.” These property rights place 
them in an advantageous economic position as urban landlords and allow them to live in great 
material comfort on rents and to become the envy of many urbanites. On the other side of the 
equation, many well-educated urban residents – college graduates in Beijing, for example – find 
themselves in disadvantaged positions in both labor and housing markets. Their situation has 
given rise to a new social phenomenon: the “ants”, or, yizu: people who, like ants, struggle in 
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low-paying, unstable jobs and live in cramped quarters – oftentimes rental houses located in peri-
urban villages and villages-in-the-city and owned by “rural” landlords. Clearly, for parties 
involved in this confrontation, the more important divide is not whether one has a rural or urban 
status in the political scheme, but whether one owns a property or not in the economic market.  
Many commentators have noted that rural migrants to cities often have to go back to their 
home villages for social reproduction and have used this as evidence to show how the politically 
defined rural status still limits migrants’ chances in cities. However, what has been less noticed 
is that many young urban residents also have to delay or even forego their social reproduction 
simply because they don’t own a property to house the to-be-formed new family. The reason for 
this has little to do with the political status, but more to do with one’s economic condition.  
To sum up, the hierarchy that may still exist between rural and urban residents is now 
undergirded by different modes of production than before. While the TMP is still in effect, the 
central processes that create rural-urban disparities are both located in the rising CMP: first, the 
transfer of surplus from rural migrant laborers to urban owners of capital through the sales and 
use of commoditized labor; and second, the transfer of surplus from rural agriculture to urban 
manufacturing and financial industries, when capital and industry increasingly control and profit 
from both the inputs and outputs of agricultural production. 
In both cities and rural areas, people’s positions in the economic hierarchy are also 
gaining importance over positions in the hierarchies of social status and political classification. 
In cities, a new economic elite, comprised of private entrepreneurs and high-salaried 
professionals working for MNCs and big state firms, not only has carved out an enviable position 
for themselves in the social hierarchy, but also made an indelible mark with their unprecedented 
wealth and extravagant lifestyles on the collective imagination of the new consumer society. In 
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recent years, another group that has attracted lots of attention is the so-called “rich second 
generation”, or, fu erdai: young adults who are born to large family wealth and are eager to 
flaunt it, often in an in-your-face manner that triggers strong reactions from the masses. 
In rural areas, class-based stratification – a hierarchy based on economic assets and 
positions – is also gaining ascendance. Under socialism, rural stratification used to be based on 
two factors: access to political power and demographic structure of the family. Since the 1980s, 
however, when, first, rural industrialization and then rural-to-urban migration unleashed the 
massive transfer of labor force from agriculture to non-agricultural jobs, access to non-farm 
wage jobs has become the greatest source of household income inequality in rural China (Khan 
and Riskin 1998). Families with political connection are still doing better; but most cadre 
families get higher income because they were able to use their political power to either secure 
wage jobs for family members or to venture into private entrepreneurship (Walder and Zhao 
2006). 
In recent years, class-based stratification even started to emerge among agricultural 
producers. Most studies have found that, up until mid-1990s, income from farming is highly 
equitable among rural households in China (Riskin, Zhao, and Li 2001). This is mainly because 
land was distributed within a village in largely egalitarian manners. Another reason is that 
farming in general was not very profitable and could not generate much wealth even for families 
who have more labor and land engaged in farming. In fact, in mid- to late-1990s, differential 
returns from off-farm work and farming became so disparate that abandoning of farm land 
became a widespread problem in some parts of China as farmers simply left for jobs in cities. 
But profound changes have taken place in Chinese agriculture in recent years. First, the exodus 
of rural labor from agriculture and the ensuing increase in available farm land has spurred a 
 30 
spontaneous growth of rural land market that enabled the circulation of farmland among 
producers and allowed larger-scale farming to emerge. Second, the rising urban demand for non-
grain foods also made commercial farming of high-value foods more profitable. As a result, new 
actors – in particular, entrepreneurial farmers and agribusiness companies – have entered 
agriculture and started to organize agricultural production on a large scale with rented land and 
hired labor (Zhang and Donaldson 2008). A new hierarchy – one that is determined in this 
emerging capitalist mode of production on the basis of one’s economic position – is transforming 
what used to be a flattened and homogeneous peasantry class into a host of unequal class 
positions (Zhang and Donaldson 2010). 
Despite the changes outlined above, the continued existence of the TMP determines that 
the divide between the officialdom and commoners would persist. In some areas, this divide is 
intensifying. With the retreat of TMP, social services ranging from healthcare to education to 
housing, which used to be subsidized for urban residents, have been marketized. As a result, for 
many urban residents now working in the non-state sectors (PCMP and CMP), rising prices for 
these goods and services are now consuming an increasing portion of their income and becoming 
heavy burdens. In the housing market in particular, they have shifted from recipients of state 
transfer of surplus under the socialist TMP to subjects of extraction under the post-socialist 
CMP, paying monopoly rent to state and corporate actors that now control the privatized urban 
housing. 
Thus, the access to state transfer of surplus under the TMP, in the form of subsidized 
housing and healthcare, job security, pension, and even the potential to collect “informal 
incomes”, became an even scarcer opportunity and greater privilege. This explains the great 
enthusiasm shown by young people in pursuing a career in state sectors. In recent yeas, a civil 
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service job has become the most sought after in the job market. In 2010, over a million 
applicants participated in the nationwide qualifying examination for civil service jobs, competing 
for 16,000 openings of government jobs, making it the most competitive examination in the 
country and showing the huge appeal that a place in the officialdom still has to the young 
generations. 
Those who are already in the officialdom are also acutely aware of their privileges and 
are actively engaged in passing down such privileges to their children. In many local government 
agencies or state firms that enjoy monopoly positions, the recruitment of new employees has 
become an intensely guarded process that only opens to insiders: children of the officialdom or 
those who can afford to pay for access. Enriched by the privileges granted by state institutions 
and protected by the rampant abuse of official power, some children of the officialdom have so 
antagonized the public with their reckless behaviors and condescending attitudes that they have 
been labeled the “officials’ second generation”, or, guan erdai, a group that is equally widely 
loathed as the fu erdai. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Many aspects of the Chinese society are still in a constant flux; but the set of hierarchies 
that are taking roots now in the social structure, as described above, are likely to be long-lasting 
features of the Chinese society for years to come. Fundamental changes have taken place in areas 
ranging from property rights, corporate governance, to market regulation to lay a stable 
institutional foundation for the operation of the three modes of production: tributary, petty-
commodity, and capitalist. The balance between the three will shift; but, barring the unlikely 
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event of regime change or economic collapse, these three modes of production and the 
socioeconomic hierarchies they generate will be here to stay. 
There is probably little doubt that the CMP is going to grow even stronger, as foreign 
investment continues to pour in and domestic firms get bigger. The increasing clout of big capital 
and growth of the CMP are squeezing the space for petty-commodity production. Unless the 
state steps in to curb the power of big capital, petty-commodity producers will face increasing 
competition in markets. Experiences from developed countries, however, show that petty-
commodity production remains viable even in capitalist economies dominated by big firms. In 
China’s case, the vast number of petty-commodity producers in rural areas provides an even 
stronger base for the persistence of the PCMP. So long as the collective land ownership in rural 
areas remains unchanged, which the central government has repeatedly asserted, rural petty-
commodity producers will retain some protection against capital’s encroachment on their land 
rights and continue to produce independently in a commoditized economy. Their rank may even 
grow as more subsistence farmers gain the skill, capital and market access to make the transition 
into commercial farming, a process that is currently unfolding in many areas of rural China. 
Experiences in developed countries and in the more developed regions of China also show that 
small household commodity producers can have an important role to play in even a capitalist 
agriculture. 
The number of large SOEs probably will decline slightly, as the central government 
announced plans to further divest itself from some less profitable SOEs in competitive sectors. 
The large SOEs that are protected by state-imposed market monopolies and constitute the core of 
the state sector, however, will remain strong. The central government has made it clear that these 
national champions will be a pillar in the national economy. In fact, some scholars even worry 
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that preferential treatments given to these state firms and persistent restrictions imposed on 
domestic private firms are tilting the market in the state firms’ favor and could suppress the 
growth of the CMP (Huang 2008). 
Just like the hybrid economy, the social structure of the Chinese society will also be 
characterized by a hybridity of hierarchies. While the politically defined statuses of officials and 
commoners continue to bring sharply different life chances to groups possessing different 
statuses, this status divide is no longer the only dimension that differentiates people and creates 
different life chances. People who are excluded from the officialdom now can nevertheless gain 
economic wealth in markets through both the PCMP and CMP. Success in market economy has 
already given rise to a growing class of economic elite. Some of them may not enjoy as much 
social prestige as officials and may even be harassed and extorted by corrupt officials, their 
economic wealth and the freedom they have to dispose it, nevertheless, are still the envy of 
many, even members of the officialdom. 
Another long-lasting hierarchy in Chinese society, the rural-urban divide, is also 
experiencing a gradual shift from a politically defined status hierarchy to an economically based 
class hierarchy. The urban-rural divide is increasingly sustained through the unequal division of 
labor and exchange relationships under a capitalist economy. The declining significance of 
political status and rising significance of economic condition in determining rural-urban 
inequality can also change the structure of the rural-urban hierarchy. In rural areas, the strong 
institutional protection of small farmers' land rights and intrinsic barriers in agriculture against 
the penetration of capital provide stronger foundations for the survival and even growth of petty-
commodity producers in agriculture. In the urban economy, in contrast, petty-commodity 
producers face increasing competition from big capital and declining profits in the production 
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process; in the consumption process, they also face rising reproduction costs driven by the 
pursuit of monopoly rents by both big capital and the state. Proletarianized urban workers who 
are exposed to the brute forces of markets are in even worse conditions. Compared to agricultural 
petty-commodity producers in rural areas, they may find that the social status they enjoy as urban 
residents, which used to put them in enviable positions in the status hierarchy under socialism, 
now provides little material comforts and is dwarfed by the economic disadvantages they 
confront in their low positions in the new class hierarchy. 
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